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« Call for more poll responses and amicus briefs | Main | "Be Careful What You Wish For: The UCL After Prop. 64" »

Thursday, November 03, 2005

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Comments

Andrew Sussman

The Article III argument seems disingenuous at best because Article III applies only to standing to sue in federal courts, not state courts --where Section 17200 cases typically are filed.

The argument also is misplaced because the issue before the Supreme Court in Mervyn's is not whether the voters could limit standing, but only whether their doing so had retroactive effect.

Kimberly A. Kralowec

I would agree with you except for the fact that Prop. 64 specifically states that its purpose is to import Article III standing rules for UCL cases (as discussed in the CLEEN brief). In light of that, the Article III argument is going to be central to any interpretation of standing under the UCL as amended by Prop. 64. In the Mervyn's case in particular, it's relevant because the plaintiff, Californians for Disability Rights, is an association whose members (presumably) suffered an injury in fact. Therefore, even if Prop. 64 applies retroactively to that pending case, it would arguably not require dismissal, because CDR (through its members) can satisfy the new standing requirement.

Prop. 64 is good law

The little word "and" was injected into the standing requirement of Prop. 64: "and lost money or property."

Voters established intent to adhere to the federal standard for "injury in fact," AND the language of the law as amended by Prop. 64 establishes that plaintiffs are required to establish BOTH injury in fact AND lost money or property in order to meet the standing requirement.

Kimberly

Well, that's one argument. The opposing view is well argued in the CLEEN amicus brief. It will be quite interesting to see how this sorts out. If anyone knows of any trial court rulings on the issue, I'd like to hear about them.

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