CONTACT ME


  • Kimberly A. Kralowec
    The Kralowec Law Group
    180 Montgomery Street,
    Suite 2000
    San Francisco, CA 94104
    Tel: (415) 546-6800
    Fax: (415) 546-6801
    Web: www.kraloweclaw.com
    Email: uclpractitioner@gmail.com

December 2014

Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat
  1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11 12 13
14 15 16 17 18 19 20
21 22 23 24 25 26 27
28 29 30 31      

« Petition for review filed in Pfizer v. Superior Court | Main | Unpublished class notice holding: Small Property Owners of San Francisco v. City and County of San Francisco »

Wednesday, August 16, 2006

TrackBack

TrackBack URL for this entry:
http://www.typepad.com/services/trackback/6a00d8345172b069e200d834de94ba69e2

Listed below are links to weblogs that reference Recent federal UCL decision: Doe v. Texaco, Inc.:

Comments

John Hurley

Regardless of what heppens with Pfizer, it seems that the result of this decision would stand, if not its reasoning. I thinnk payment of money to a third party should constitute economic loss confering standing under a plain reading of the statute, but it would not support a remedy of restitution. And unless the plaintiffs can plead and prove that they would personally suffer future harm, they could not obtain an injunction. Without an available remedy, they would have no claim.

Kimberly

You may be right about that. The "injury in fact" that I speculated about in my post probably would not fit the traditional definition of "restitution," but it would satisfy Prop. 64's new standing requirement. Of course, this raises the question first identified by Jeff Fazio here — now that the plaintiff must prove what amounts to damages, and now that the UCL's "streamlined procedure" has been complicated by a class certification requirement, why should damages not be recoverable as they were under early UCL jurisprudence? In any event, it's hard to say what the outcome should be in Doe v. Texaco because the order, unfortunately, does not describe the facts or the claims in sufficient detail.

John Hurley

The facts are definitely sparse and it would be nice to know more.

The more I think about it, based on the few facts that are apparent, maybe injunctive relief could be appropriate. Even if the name plaintiffs aren't going to be decieved in the future (since they already know the falsity of the defendant's statements) they might be able to get an injunction on the basis that deception of others in the future could result in harm to them personally due to additional resultant environmental damage.

The comments to this entry are closed.

2014 Supreme Court Calendar


Research


Disclaimer


  • Nothing in this blog constitutes legal advice. If you need legal advice, consult an attorney in your jurisdiction. To read this blog's complete disclaimer, click here.


  • The UCL Practitioner
    © 2003-2014
    by Kimberly A. Kralowec
    All rights reserved.


  • Enter your email address:

    Delivered by FeedBurner




  • Header design by Webmotion
    Photos by Jack Gescheidt
    Powered by TypePad