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Friday, February 29, 2008

Articles in January/February 2008 issue of Forum

The January/February 2008 issue of Forum, the magazine of Consumer Attorneys of California, recently arrived in the mail. Two articles are of particular interest:

  • H. Scott Leviant and Jason E. Barsanti, "Maximize Recovery in Unpaid Wage Cases" (discussing use of contract-based theories of recovery in unpaid overtime class actions)

  • Michael D. Singer, "Pre-Certification Communication With Putative Class Members" (discussing recent decisional law on discovery of class member contact information as well as propriety of defense contacts with putative class members)

Both articles are very good and will soon be available online to CAOC members only.

Wednesday, February 27, 2008

BREAKING NEWS: Supreme Court to issue private attorney general doctrine opinion tomorrow: Olson v. Autombile Club of Southern California

Tomorrow morning at 10:00 a.m., the Supreme Court will release its opinion in a case involving Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, the private attorney general doctrine:

Olson v. Automobile Club of Southern California, no. S143999 (argued in San Francisco 1-09-08) The court limited review to the following issue: Is a prevailing plaintiff who is awarded attorney’s fees under the private attorney general statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5) entitled to recover expert witness fees?

When the opinion is up, it will be available at this link: Olson v. Automobile Club of Southern California, __ Cal.4th ___ (Feb. 28, 2008).

UPDATE: The opinion is up. The Supreme Court held that "a prevailing plaintiff is not entitled to an award of expert witness fees in addition to attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5." Slip op. at 2.

Tuesday, February 26, 2008

Reminder: Will Stern's UCL conference tonight in San Francisco and tomorrow in Los Angeles

It is not too late to register to attend Will Stern's annual UCL seminar, sponsored by the Rutter Group. It will take place tonight in San Francisco and tomorrow night in Los Angeles. Will's co-speakers will be Sharon J. Arkin of Arkin & Glovsky and Justice H. Walter Croskey of the Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District, Division Three. I won't be able to make it myself, but I encourage others to attend. Will's seminar is always the best!

Monday, February 25, 2008

Supplemental letter briefs from In re Tobacco II Cases

Many thanks to the blog reader who forwarded copies of the supplemental letter briefs filed in In re Tobacco II Cases, no. S147345, the case in which the Supreme Court will address whether reliance is an element of a UCL claim after Proposition 64. As I previously reported, in October, the Supreme Court ordered supplemental briefing on the impact, if any, of its preemption opinion handed down in August. See In re Tobacco Cases II (Daniels), 41 Cal.4th 1257 (2007). The parties seem to agree that the preemption opinion should have no impact on the reliance case. Plaintiffs argue that the UCL claims in question are different from those the Court held were preempted, while defendants assert that "no substantive preemption ... issue is properly before the Court." Here are links to the letter briefs:

One of the letter briefs points out that a petition for a writ of certiorari is pending with the U.S. Supreme Court. Daniels v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., no. 07-740. The questions presented in the cert. petition are:

1. Whether the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. 1334(b), preempts a claim that respondents engaged in unfair competition under California Bus. & Prof. Code 17200, by purposefully targeting persons under 18 years old in the marketing and advertising of cigarettes, thereby inducing and profiting from transactions that are prohibited under California law?

2. Whether (a) commercial advertising that is intentionally designed to encourage minors to obtain cigarettes is entitled to protection under the First Amendment, so long as its audience does not exclusively consist of minors and, if it is, (b) whether the California Supreme Court's conclusion -- that providing a civil remedy against those who actively induce and profit from unlawful cigarette sales is unconstitutional -- can be squared with this Court's exposition of the “narrow tailoring” prong of the Central Hudson test?

Daniels v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 2007 WL 4231074, *i (Nov. 30, 2007).

Friday, February 22, 2008

New UCL "injury in fact" decision: Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Mendes

In Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Mendes, ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (Feb. 15, 2008), the Court of Appeal (Fifth Appellate District) held that the plaintiffs—two consumers of dairy products—lacked standing to pursue a UCL claim against ranchers who allegedly confined dairy calves in isolation crates without an "adequate exercise area," in violation of Penal Code section 579t. The plaintiffs, the Court held, had not suffered "loss of money or property": "Here, the consumers had the benefit of their bargain—that is, they received dairy products that were not of inferior quality. Any injury they suffered upon learning 'the truth' about industrial dairy farming was not economic." Slip op. at 11.

The Court also held that the Penal Code provision that the defendants allegedly violated carries no private right of action. Id. at 4-9.

"§17200 Practice - Life After Prop. 64"

The Rutter Group's annual conference on the UCL, featuring William L. Stern of Morrison & Forester, is coming up on Tuesday, February 26, in San Francisco, and Wednesday, February 27, in Los Angeles. Both programs run from 6:00 to 9:15 p.m. (registration at 5:30).

As most everyone knows, Will is the author of the leading practice guide on the UCL. Will's program is always very good, and I'm sure this year will be no exception, especially considering his co-speakers. Joining Will on the panel this year are Sharon J. Arkin of Arkin & Glovsky and Justice H. Walter Croskey of the Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District, Division Three.

Many thanks to the blog reader who told me about this on the phone today.

Thursday, February 21, 2008

Thanks for tuning in!

Thanks to those who signed up and listened to the law blogging webcast this morning, which just concluded moments ago. I hope I will hear feedback from some of you by email (uclpractitioner@gmail.com) or perhaps in the comments to this post. By way of further response to one of the questions, you can see that putting up a blog post is often just as quick and easy as sending out an email. Thanks to Howard and Craig, as well as to Doug from West Legalworks, for your help in putting together what I hope was a great program.

UPDATE: Here is a link to the materials from the seminar: Resources for Law Bloggers. To follow up on one of the topics we covered, you will notice that I uploaded this document at a site called 17200blog.com, which is one of my domain names. My very patient friend Gary hosts that domain for me and allows me to put up documents on his server for free. I also could have uploaded it to Typepad, which includes a limited amount of storage space with my account. If your firm is sponsoring your blog, presumably you could arrange for documents to be posted on its server. Document storage is one thing to consider on the technical side when starting a new law blog.

Can a UCL "unlawful" prong claim be predicated on out-of-state law?

I have been asked before whether a UCL "unlawful" prong claim may be predicated on the defendant's violation of the law of another state. California case law is very clear that the UCL prohibits "any practices forbidden by law, be it civil or criminal, federal, state, or municipal, statutory, regulatory, or court-made." See, e.g., South Bay Chevrolet v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 72 Cal.App.4th 861, 880 (1999). However, I could not think of any case that addressed whether another state's laws could form the basis of a UCL claim.

Then, a couple of weeks ago, I was doing research on another subject and I found a case from 2001 holding that the defendant's violation of Delaware law could also constitute a UCL violation:

As a preliminary issue, [defendant] Sematech argues that PSI's claim fails because it cannot rely on an out-of-state law as a predicate for a UCL claim. However, Sematech has not cited any authority, nor is the court aware of any, prohibiting PSI from doing so. Instead, California law on the UCL emphasizes the broad nature of a UCL claim. See Cel-Tech [Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co.], 20 Cal.4th [163,] 181 [(1999)]; Hewlett v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp., 54 Cal.App. 4th 499, 531-32 (1997) (the "unlawful" practices prohibited by the UCL are "any practices forbidden by law, be it civil or criminal, federal, state or municipal, statutory, regulatory, or court-made") (quoting Saunders v. Sup.Ct., 27 Cal.App. 4th 832, 838-39 (1994)). Accordingly, the court finds that PSI may bring its UCL claim based on a violation of Delaware law. [FN18]

FN18. Norwest Mortgage, Inc. v. Sup.Ct., 72 Cal.App. 4th 214 (1999), relied on by Sematech, does not require a contrary holding. There, the question presented was whether a UCL action could be granted nationwide class certification when some of the actions complained of were performed out of state and effected out of state plaintiffs with no nexus to California. The court held that with respect to these claims only, the lack of any nexus to California made it inappropriate to apply the UCL. The court did not decide whether an out-of-state law could serve as a predicate for a UCL claim because no out-of-state laws were involved.

Process Specialties, Inc. v. Sematech, Inc., 2001 WL 36105562, *15 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2001). Does anyone have any other case law on this question?

Wednesday, February 20, 2008

Reminder: Law blogging webinar tomorrow

Registration is still open for tomorrow's West Legalworks webinar, "Law Blogging for Fun and Profit: Building Your Audience, Building Your Practice." The webinar is from 9:00-10:30 a.m. Pacific. I will be one of the speakers, along with J. Craig Williams of May it Please the Court and Howard Bashman of How Appealing. Readers of this blog may receive a 15% discount by using discount code WLW15 at checkout.

Review denied in class certification case: Lewis v. Robinson Ford Sales

During its conference last week, the Supreme Court declined to review the Court of Appeal's decision in Lewis v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc., 156 Cal.App.4th 359 (2007). In that case, the Court of Appeal (Fourth Appellate District, Division One) reversed an order denying class certification. My original post on the opinion is here.

Tuesday, February 19, 2008

Two new decisions on private attorney general doctrine attorneys' fees: Adoption of Joshua S. and Roybal v. Governing Board

Two new decisions construing the private attorney general doctrine of Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 have recently been handed down.

In Adoption of Joshua S., ___ Cal.4th ___ (Jan. 24, 2008), the Supreme Court held that "section 1021.5 does not authorize an award of attorney fees against an individual who has done nothing to adversely affect the rights of the public or a substantial class of people other than raise an issue in the course of private litigation that could establish legal precedent adverse to a portion of the public ...." Slip op. at 2. The Court agreed with the argument that "section 1021.5 attorney fees should not be imposed on parties ... who ha[ve] only engaged in litigation to adjudicate private rights from which important appellate precedent happens to emerge, but has otherwise done nothing to compromise the rights of the public or a significant class of people." Id. at 8.

And in Roybal v. Governing Board, ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (Jan. 11, 2008; pub. ord. Feb. 6, 2008), the Court of Appeal (Sixth Appellate District) reversed a fees award under section 1021.5, holding that the action had not "resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest." Slip op. at 5-9, passim.

Friday, February 15, 2008

"Choose Litigation: It's at the Center of Law, a Noble Profession"

I liked this Forum article (subscription) from last Monday's Daily Journal. Former Orange County Superior Court Judge William Scheffield is very enthusiastic about the legal profession, particularly litigation, as a calling. He also articulates an interesting perspective on the advocate's role:

Some may say law is a science and a litigator a scientist. Don't believe them. What happens in the courtroom is art, not science. A litigator is an artist, a sculptor. Who wins in the courtroom depends on which litigator can best shape the perspective of the decision maker. A litigator's job is to sculpt the perspective of the juror or judge in a way that harmonizes with his or her side of the case by leading the juror back in time - recreating the past, weaving facts and law in a way leading toward his or her client's perspective. The difference between science and art is that in science - take mathematics - two plus two is always four. A good litigator might argue it's five. Litigation is about shaping perspective using the artistry of persuasion. Getting at "truth" requires you taking the juror or judge as you recreate and reshape the past - without instant replay, video or crystal ball and, not to be pejorative, spin. I tell litigants that there really is no "truth" in the courtroom, only perspective. This makes the courtroom risky business. With good lawyers on each side sculpting the past, what begins for the client as a black-and-white, dead-bang winner turns to gray when the spinning is spun. There are two certainties in the courtroom: You don't know what's going to happen, and whatever does happen will be expensive.


Thursday, February 14, 2008

"Limiting Legal Scope": the economic abstention doctrine

On February 7, 2008, the Daily Journal ran a Focus article called "Limiting Legal Scope" (subscription). The article addresses, from a defense-oriented perspective, the economic abstention doctrine that has developed in the UCL case law. According to the article,

The [UCL] frequently has met its match when claims of unlawfulness depend on borrowed laws that an executive agency has been assigned to enforce. Courts have abstained or declined equitable jurisdiction in unfair-competition cases that ask them to assume administrative-agency functions, to make ad hoc determinations of economic policy or to regulate defendants with rulings, injunctions and other equitable remedies that might conflict with an agency's adjudication of the same subject.

That summary of the law reflects a defendant-centric interpretation of the decisions. The thing to keep in mind is that the key factor is not whether an agency already regulates the area, but whether the area involves questions of complex economic policy that the legislative (or executive) branch is better equipped to deal with. The fact that agency regulations may also govern the particular subject matter of the case does not mean that the UCL claim fails. Rather, under Cel-Tech and the economic abstention decisions, the UCL claim fails only if (a) the regulation expressly permits the challenged conduct, or (b) the regulated area raises complex questions of economic policy that should be left to regulative bodies.

The article also does not cite the cases in which courts have declined to apply the "economic abstention doctrine," of which there are many. See, e.g., McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc., 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1473-74 (2006) ("While we appreciate the wisdom of abstention in matters calling for a legislative determination of economic policy, we do not believe abstention is required in the instant case.").

Here are a few of my prior blog posts on the subject:

Thanks to the blog reader who emailed me a copy of the article.

Wednesday, February 13, 2008

"The Unofficial E-Filing Manual for the U.S. District Court, Central District of California"

On Janury 30, 2008, the Daily Journal had a short article (subscription) about a document that sounds very handy for those of us practicing in the Central District of California, which just adopted mandatory e-filing rules for virtually all civil cases (see C.D. Cal. Gen. Order 08-02 (superseding Gen. Order 07-08)). Attorney Martin W. Anderson has made our lives easier by creating "The Unofficial E-Filing Manual for the United States District Court, Central District of California," available for free download at his site. According to the Daily Journal article, "The guide is loaded with tips about the ins and outs of civil e-filing in the Central District. It details the specific submission procedures for 30 unique types of civil filings, from complaints to proposed judgments." Thanks, Martin!

See also Martin's Forum article in the January 28, 2008 issue of the Daily Journal: "Eight Tips Help Lawyers Adjust to Mandatory E-Filing Requirements" (subscription).

UPDATE: A couple of the links were broken in this post. Have fixed them, including the link to Gen. Order 07-08, which has been superseded by C.D. Cal. Gen. Order 08-02 (dated February 7, 2008). Thanks to the reader who emailed me about this problem.

Tuesday, February 12, 2008

"High Court OKs Suit Over Pink Salmon"

Today's Recorder has an article (subscription) on the Salmon decision. The Daily Journal also reports that "High Court Allows Suits Over Salmon" (subscription).

Looking at the decision more closely last night, it doesn't really say anything particularly new or interesting about the UCL or CLRA. The rationale for the decision was that the California law on which the UCL claim was predicated (i.e., the Sherman Food, Drug and Cosmetic Law (Health & Saf. Code §§ 109875 et seq.)) was "identical" to the relevant provisions of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq.). The opinion did not analyze the CLRA claim separately from the UCL claim.

The opinion did have one interesting footnote that should remove any doubts concerning the propriety of citing unpublished federal district court rulings in California state courts:

In their briefs, the parties discuss an unpublished federal district court opinion which came to the same conclusion when considering nearly identical facts. (Vermont Pure Holdings, Ltd. v. Nestle Waters North America, Inc. (D.Mass., Mar. 28, 2006, No. Civ. A. 03-11465) 2006 WL 839486, *6, fn. 3.) Citing unpublished federal opinions does not violate our rules. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115.) We find the court’s reasoning persuasive.

Slip op. at 22 n.18 (emphasis in original).

Federal decision on UCL "unlawful" prong: Gabana Gulf Distribution, Ltd. v. GAP Intern. Sales, Inc.

In Gabana Gulf Distribution, Ltd. v. GAP Intern. Sales, Inc., 2008 WL 111223 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2008), the Court (Judge Charles R. Breyer) held that a UCL "unlawful" prong claim may be predicated on violation of a common-law rule (specifically, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing):

Because the Court has denied summary judgment to Gap on the breach of covenant claim, summary judgment must also be DENIED as to the § 17200 claim because Gabana may use the covenant claim as a predicate for § 17200 liability. Although the state of § 17200 jurisprudence is in rapid flux, California courts have not yet foreclosed common law theories--such as breach of the covenant of good faith--as a basis for actions pursuant to § 17200. See Mercado v. Allstate Ins. Co., 340 F.3d 824, 828 n. 3 (9th Cir.2003); Diaz v. Allstate Ins. Group, 185 F.R.D. 581, 595 (C.D.Cal.1998) ("[A]llegations of fraudulent and unfair business activity are sufficient to state a cause of action for relief under the UCA.").

As I explained in this prior post, such a holding is significant because few decisions have confirmed that an "unlawful" prong claim may be predicated on violation of a common-law rule (although plenty of published opinions say in general terms that violations of "court-made" law are actionable under the "unlawful" prong).

Monday, February 11, 2008

New Supreme Court preemption decision: Farm Raised Salmon Cases

As I reported last Friday, the Supreme Court is due to post its opinion in Farm Raised Salmon Cases, no. S147171, by this morning at 10:00 a.m. When the decision is up, it will be accessible at this link: Farm Raised Salmon Cases, ___ Cal.4th ___ (Feb. 11, 2008). I will try to update this post later today with a summary of the holding.

UPDATE: As Kelly Chen predicted in her report on the argument, the Supreme Court has held that the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not preempt plaintiffs' UCL and CLRA claims:

Plaintiffs filed a class and representative action alleging that various grocery stores violated state law by selling artificially colored farmed salmon without disclosing to their customers the use of color additives. Defendants successfully demurred in the trial court, arguing the action was preempted by section 337(a) of title 21 of the United States Code, a provision of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) (21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.). The Court of Appeal affirmed the resulting judgment of dismissal.

We granted review to decide whether plaintiffs’ action was preempted by the FDCA. We conclude that section 337(a) does not preempt the action as plaintiffs do not seek to “enforce[ ], or to restrain violations” of, the FDCA. (§ 337(a).) Rather, plaintiffs’ claims for deceptive marketing of food products are predicated on state laws establishing independent state disclosure requirements “identical to” the disclosure requirements imposed by the FDCA, something Congress explicitly approved in section 343-1. (§ 343-1(a)(3).) Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment and remand the matter to that court for further proceedings consistent with our opinion.

Slip op. at 1-2.

Saturday, February 09, 2008

"Bloggers at their computers are Supermen in flight"

From a February 14th article in the New York Times Review of Books:

Bloggers at their computers are Supermen in flight. They break the rules. They go into their virtual phone booths, put on their costumes, bring down their personal villains, and save the world.

Yeah!

Friday, February 08, 2008

BREAKING NEWS: Supreme Court to issue opinion Monday in UCL preemption case: Farm Raised Salmon Cases

Today, the Supreme Court announced that it will be issuing its opinion Monday morning in an important preemption case, Farm Raised Salmon Cases, no. S147171. This case raises the following issue: "Does the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.) impliedly preempt plaintiffs’ state law claims [including a UCL claim] against defendants for deceptive marketing of food products by failing to disclose that farmed salmon sold in their stores contains artificial coloring?" The Court of Appeal answered yes. See Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 142 Cal.App.4th 805 (2006).

Attorney Kelly Chen attended the Supreme Court argument in December and wrote up a report, which is available at this link. Kelly reported that the justices' questions suggested that they are leaning against a finding of preemption.

When the opinion is posted online Monday morning at 10:00 a.m., it should be available here: Farm Raised Salmon Cases, ___ Cal.4th ___ (Feb. 11, 2008).

"Law Blogging for Fun and Profit: Building Your Audience, Building Your Practice"

On Tuesday, February 21, 2008 at 9:00-11:30 10:30 a.m. Pacific, I will speak at a webinar sponsored by West Legalworks called "Law Blogging for Fun and Profit: Building Your Audience, Building Your Practice." My co-speakers are the authors of two leading law blogs, J. Craig Williams of May it Please the Court and Howard Bashman of How Appealing. I'm so psyched to be a co-panelist with both of them!

Please sign up to listen in and submit questions. We will discuss our experiences as law bloggers, including tips on starting your blog, finding your niche and voice, building your audience and reputation, and how law blogging has helped us develop our practices. To get a 15% discount off the registration fee (which is $165), use discount code WLW15 at checkout. That's a special code for my contacts, which include all of the readers of this blog.

CORRECTION: The webinar is 90 minutes long, from 9:00 a.m. to 10:30 (not 11:30).

Thursday, February 07, 2008

Recent federal UCL "safe harbor" decision: Williams v. Washington Mutual Bank

In Williams v. Washington Mutual Bank, 2008 WL 115097 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2008), the court (Judge William B. Schubb) had this to say about the Cel-Tech "safe harbor":

California's UCL restricts "any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue, or misleading advertising." Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 17200. The UCL " 'borrows' violations from other laws by making them independently actionable as unfair competitive practices." Korea Supply Co. v. Lockhead Martin Corp., 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1143 (2003). However, "[w]hen specific legislation provides a 'safe harbor,' plaintiffs may not use the general unfair competition law to assault that harbor." Cal-Tech [sic] Commc'ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal.4th 163, 182-83 (1999); Schnall v. Hertz Corp., 78 Cal.App. 4th 1144, 1154 (2000). Therefore, plaintiff cannot assert a UCL claim if a federal or state law legalizes defendant's practice. See Augustine v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 485 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1176 (E.D.Cal.2007) (stating that federal or state law can provide a safe harbor).

As discussed above, [T]ILA authorizes defendant's practice because defendant provides sufficient notice in its initial disclosures. Defendant's practice comes within the UCL's "safe harbor," thus negating plaintiff's ability to challenge the practice under the UCL. C[e]l-Tech Commc'ns, Inc., 20 Cal.4th at 182-83. Accordingly, the court must dismiss plaintiff's third cause of action.

Id. at *4-*5.

Wednesday, February 06, 2008

A collection of recent articles on CAFA

On November 30 and December 1, 2007, the University of Pennslyvania Law Review conducted a symposium entitled "Fairness to Whom? Perspectives on the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005." The papers presented at the symposium will appear in a forthcoming issue of the Review. Meanwhile, draft copies of a number of the papers are available at this link, and they sound very interesting:

Tuesday, February 05, 2008

U.S. Supreme Court takes up UDAP statute preemption case: Altria Group v. Good

On January 18, 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court granted cert. in Altria Group v. Good, no. 07-562. In that case, the Court will address whether the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act ("FCLAA") (15 U.S.C. §§1331 et seq.) preempts a consumer protection claim based on a state UDAP statute** very similar to the UCL. The First Circuit held that the FCLAA did not preempt the claim to the extent it challenged defendants' marketing of cigarettes as "light" or containing "lower tar and nicotine." Good v. Altria, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 246003 (1st Cir. Aug. 31, 2007). SCOTUSBlog provides a collection of links to the Supreme Court briefs filed to date (scroll down).

The case is worth following because it will probably inform California state courts' analyses of federal preemption issues. In In re Tobacco Cases II, 41 Cal.4th 1257 (2007), for example, the California Supreme Court held that the FCLAA preempted a UCL claim to the extent that it "seeks to impose on defendant tobacco companies a duty not to advertise in a way that could encourage minors to smoke," citing Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001). (See these blog posts for more.)

**A "UDAP statute" is a state statute prohibiting unfair and deceptive acts and practices, such as the UCL.

Monday, February 04, 2008

Another new class member discovery decision: CashCall, Inc. v. Superior Court

In CashCall, Inc. v. Superior Court, ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (Jan. 24, 2008), the Court of Appeal (Fourth Appellate District, Division One) handed down another significant discovery-related opinion, holding that the trial court appropriately permitted "precertification discovery in a class action for the purpose of identifying class members who may become substitute plaintiffs in place of named plaintiffs who were not members of the class they purported to represent." Slip op at 2.

In so holding, the Court distinguished First American Title Ins. Co v. Superior Court (Sjobring), 146 Cal.App.4th 1564 (2007). In First American, the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Three) refused to permit such discovery to "a class action representative plaintiff [who] is not – and never was – a member of the class he purports to represent" because, under the circumstances of that case, "the grant of such discovery would sanction an abuse of the class action procedure." Id. at 1566. In CashCall, the Court of Appeal found First American distinguishable:

Unlike in First American, we conclude the potential for abuse of the class action procedure is not significant in this case. In First American, the plaintiff essentially "appointed himself enforcement officer for the California Department of Insurance settlement agreement" and "piggybacked" his class action onto that settlement agreement (possibly to obtain attorney fees). (First American, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 1577.) That scenario appears to exemplify the classic type of abusive class action of which CashCall warns. However, those circumstances do not exist in this case. There is no state or other investigation, much less a settlement, involving CashCall's secret call monitoring program. Absent continuation of the instant class action, there likely will be no other investigation of CashCall's conduct or potential relief obtained by class members for its alleged violations of their privacy rights. Furthermore, because only CashCall has knowledge of which customers' calls were monitored, the plaintiffs cannot be faulted for filing a class action based on the suspicion their privacy rights may have been violated and only later learning from CashCall that their calls had not been monitored (and therefore they do not have standing). Accordingly, unlike in First American, the potential for abuse of the class action procedure in this case is minimal. Neither the reasoning nor the result in First American persuades us that the trial court in this case abused its discretion by granting the plaintiffs' motion for precertification discovery of the identities of class members. Rather, we conclude the trial court, in applying the Parris balancing test, did not abuse its discretion.

CashCall, slip op. at 34-35 (citing Parris v. Superior Court, 109 Cal.App.4th 285 (2003)).

The Court described the "Parris balancing test" as follows:

In deciding whether to order precertification discovery of the identities of potential class members, a "trial court must . . . expressly identify any potential abuses of the class action procedure that may be created if the discovery is permitted, and weigh the danger of such abuses against the rights of the parties under the circumstances."

Id. at 11. Whether to permit the discovery is within the trial court's discretion. Id. The Court rejected CashCall's proposed "bright-line rule," under which "a trial court [would be] required to deny a motion for precertification discovery, without applying the Parris balancing test and exercising its discretion to permit precertification discovery." Id. at 12 (footnote omitted). The Court explained:

Although we agree with the general principle that a plaintiff must have standing to assert a cause of action, we are not persuaded by CashCall's assertion in the context of class actions that standing of the original named plaintiff(s) at the beginning of the action is necessarily a requirement for continuation of the action. Rather, we conclude that a trial court, exercising its reasonable discretion in applying the Parris balancing test in the circumstances of a particular case, may order precertification discovery of the identities of class members (i.e., those with standing) who, when contacted, ultimately may elect to be substituted as named plaintiffs to continue prosecution of the class action on behalf of the class.

Id. at 13.

My prior posts on First American are here and here. Another recent discovery-related decision, handed down nine days before CashCall, is also of interest. My post on Puerto v. Superior Court (Wild Oats Markets, Inc.), ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (Jan. 15, 2008) (Second Appellate District, Division Seven) is available at this link.

Saturday, February 02, 2008

"Changing the Online Legal Landscape"

In an article dated January 23, 2008 on Law.com, Robert Ambrogi highlighted his "five most notable legal sites of 2007." They are: Avvo; Public.Resource.Org; AltLaw; ABA Journal; and Justia (aka Blawg Search).[Via Avvoblog.]

Friday, February 01, 2008

Statement of issues on review in Reid v. Google

The Supreme Court's statement of issues on review in Reid v. Google, no. S158965, is up. It looks like the UCL restitution issue will not be a major focus of the case:

Petition for review after the Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment in a civil action. This case presents the following issues: (1) Should California law recognize the "stray remarks" doctrine, which permits the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment to disregard isolated discriminatory remarks or comments unrelated to the decision-making process as insufficient to establish discrimination? (2) Are evidentiary objections not expressly ruled on at the time of decision on a summary judgment motion preserved for appeal?

UPDATE: The blog Cal Biz Lit has an interesting post on the summary judgment issues that the Supreme Court will be reviewing in this case. And an article by Mike McKee in Monday's Recorder reports that "Google Appeal Carries Big Evidence Issue." An excerpt:

E-mails were flying between litigators Thursday as word spread that the California Supreme Court had agreed to resolve a thorny issue over how trial court judges should treat evidence.

Specifically, the high court decided Wednesday it was time to take a closer look at so-called Biljac rulings to clarify what lawyers and trial court judges must do to ensure that evidentiary objections are preserved for appellate review when summary judgment motions are decided.

For more discussion of the Biljac issue, see this post from my other blog, The Appellate Practitioner.

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