The Supreme Court's opinion is now up in Meyer v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., ___ Cal.4th ___ (Jan. 29, 2009). It holds that Civil Code section 1780(a) creates a standing requirement even for CLRA injunctive relief cases, and that plaintiffs lacked standing where the defendant inserted an unconscionable provision into a contract (which the CLRA prohibits) but had not yet attempted to enforce it. Slip op. at 3-14. Notably, the opinion expressly disapproves part of Kagan v. Gibraltar Sav. & Loan Assn., 35 Cal.3d 582, 593 (1984), where the Supreme Court had previously said “we interpret broadly the requirement of section 1780 that a consumer ‘suffer[ ] any damage’ to include the infringement of any legal right as defined by section 1770.” Id. at 10 n.3.
I view this case as an outgrowth of Prop. 64. I do not think that litigants or courts would have focused so heavily on reading an actual damage "standing" requirement into the CLRA if not for that fact that most CLRA cases also include UCL claims. After Prop. 64, UCL standing was on everyone's mind and was actively and repeatedly litigated in cases that also included CLRA claims. We have seen Prop. 64 bleed over into several other causes of action, not just the CLRA. The CLRA is simply the most notable example of a related, but separate, claim that Prop. 64 jurisprudence has significantly affected.