I'm sure everyone is well aware of famous footnote 17 in Tobacco II:
We emphasize that our discussion of causation in this case is limited to such cases where, as here, a UCL action is based on a fraud theory involving false advertising and misrepresentations to consumers. The UCL defines "unfair competition" as "includ[ing] any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice . . . ." (§ 17200.) There are doubtless many types of unfair business practices in which the concept of reliance, as discussed here, has no application.
In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal.4th 298, 325 n.17 (2009) (emphasis added). The example I like to use of a UCL case in which "the concept of reliance ... has no application" is an "unlawful" prong case predicated on a Labor Code violation. Either the defendant calculated the overtime rate correctly or it did not. The class members' reliance, or lack thereof, is irrelevant to the named plaintiff's standing (and to the violation).
Kwikset has a similar footnote:
While plaintiffs also allege unlawful conduct, in that Kwikset violated Business and Professions Code sections 17500 and 17533.7 and Civil Code section 1770, subdivision (a)(4), these statutory provisions simply codify prohibitions against certain specific types of misrepresentations. The theory of the case is that Kwikset engaged in misrepresentations and deceived consumers. Thus, our remarks in In re Tobacco II Cases, supra, 46 Cal.4th 298, concerning the cause requirement in deception cases, are apposite. (See Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1363 [“[T]he reasoning of Tobacco II [concerning the cause requirement] applies equally to the ‘unlawful’ prong of the UCL when, as here, the predicate unlawfulness is misrepresentation and deception.”]; Hale v. Sharp Healthcare, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 1385 [In re Tobacco II Cases’ discussion of causation applies equally to unlawful UCL claims based on misrepresentation].) As in In re Tobacco II Cases, at page 325, footnote 17, we need express no views concerning the proper construction of the cause requirement in other types of cases.
Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (Benson), 51 Cal.4th 310, 2011 WL 240278, *8 n.9 (2011) (emphasis added). The opinion's approval of Durell and Hale on this point is interesting, but I think my Labor Code example remains apt.