Here is the new decision I mentioned during the afternoon session at yesterday's Bridgeport conference: Paulus v. Bob Lynch Ford, Inc., ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (May 17, 2006). In Paulus, the Sixth Appellate District rejected a claim for malicious prosecution of a UCL action. Its discussion of the UCL, and Prop. 64, is extensive, and the case is also noteworthy because the Sixth District has never before had occasion to mention Prop. 64. In Paulus, it does so in dicta. (Slip op. at 16-18 fns. 13, 14.) Nor am I aware of any other appellate decision involving malicious prosecution and the UCL. Given the court's language in Paulus, I think it would be very hard to successfully pursue such a malicious prosecution claim:
In evaluating the probable cause element in a malicious prosecution claim, we are mindful that we must render “a sensitive evaluation of legal principles and precedents” (Sheldon Appel, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 875), and we “must properly take into account the evolutionary potential of legal principles.” (Id. at p. 886.) Because of (1) the disfavored status of malicious prosecution claims, (2) the “rather lenient standard” of probable cause (Wilson, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 817), (3) the broad scope of the UCL, and (4) the UCL’s intended purpose of addressing, among other things, unfair conduct that “may run the gamut of human ingenuity and chicanery” (People ex rel. Mosk v. National Research Co. of Cal., supra, 201 Cal.App.2d at p. 772), we conclude that Paulus failed to make a prima facie showing that Lynch’s UCL claim (under either the “unlawful” or “unfair” prongs) lacked probable cause.(Slip op. at 27.)
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