Yesterday, the Ninth Circuit withdrew its opinion from February in the Wal-Mart gender discrimination case, Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2007), and issued a new, slightly revised opinion, Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., ___ F.3d ___ (Dec. 11, 2007). The panel also denied the petition for en banc rehearing as "moot," and indicated that the "parties may file a new petition for rehearing or suggestion for rehearing en banc as provided for by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 40."
I have not yet had an opportunity to read the new opinion and compare it to the prior one. Today, however, in an article called "Ninth Circuit Limits Wal-Mart Class," the Recorder reports that "[t]he largest substantive change involved standing within the class: The panel instructed U.S. District Judge Martin Jenkins to consider dropping class members who were no longer employed by Wal-Mart at the time the complaint was filed. However, the circuit shot down Wal-Mart's argument that this standing issue should tank the entire class." From the article, it sounds like the new opinion more thoroughly discusses whether the primary relief sought is declaratory and injunctive, vs. monetary, which is relevant to class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2).
UPDATE: Howard Bashman has a few thoughts on the new opinion at his blog, How Appealing.
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