In Gerard v. Orange Coast Memorial Medical Center, ___ Cal. App.4th ___ (Feb. 10, 2015), the Court of Appeal (Fourth Appellate District, Division Three) reversed the trial court's order granting the defendant's preemptive motion to deny class certification.
Such motions are discussed here, as well as in my article, “A Tool for Mischief: Preemptive Defense Motions Under BCBG Overtime Cases to Reject Class Certification,” CAOC Forum, January/February 2009 (with Kevin K. Green) (CAOC members-only link).
The trial court granted the defense motion after concluding that the named plaintiffs "failed to show that they have any claim against the Defendant." Slip op. at 4. In its opinion, the Court of Appeal focused primarily on a substantive legal question involving second meal periods, which, it held, the trial court had incorrectly resolved in the defendant's favor. Id. at 5-17. On class certification, the Court of Appeal said this:
[Plaintiffs] argue the court improperly denied class certification for several reasons. Among other things they cite as an abuse of discretion the court’s community interest analysis based on its erroneous “legal assumption that ‘liability is not established by an illegal policy.’” Plaintiffs contend that assumption is contrary to the holding of Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at page 1033, and Faulkinbury v. Boyd & Associates, Inc. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 220, 232. We conclude this argument has merit.
Brinker summarized the applicable standard of review as follows: “On review of a class certification order, an appellate court’s inquiry is narrowly circumscribed. ‘The decision to certify a class rests squarely within the discretion of the trial court, and we afford that decision great deference on appeal, reversing only for a manifest abuse of discretion: “Because trial courts are ideally situated to evaluate the efficiencies and practicalities of permitting group action, they are afforded great discretion in granting or denying certification.” [Citation.] A certification order generally will not be disturbed unless (1) it is unsupported by substantial evidence, (2) it rests on improper criteria, or (3) it rests on erroneous legal assumptions. [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1022.)
The central truth of the court’s nearly two-page order denying class certification is set forth near the beginning where the court explained: “One of the most basic requirements for class certification is that the proposed Representative Plaintiffs show that they have a prima facie claim. For, if Plaintiffs do not have a claim there can be no typicality or commonality. Here, the proposed Representative Plaintiffs have failed to show that they have any claim against the Defendant.”
As we have explained above, plaintiffs have shown their invalid second meal period policy and waiver theory is potentially viable, and plaintiffs have proffered substantial evidence hospital violated the governing law by failing to provide second meal periods or premium pay in lieu thereof on shifts longer than 12 hours as required. The court’s contrary conclusions rest on improper criteria and assumptions that are erroneous as a matter of law. Consequently, we conclude the court abused its discretion by denying [plaintiffs] class certification on the grounds plaintiffs failed to show they have any claim. We express no opinion on the other stated grounds for denial of class certification but instead direct the court to consider them further on remand.
Id. at 20-21. Another reason for reversing the order would be that the trial court improperly reached and resolved a substantive merits question at the class certification stage, which Brinker held should be avoided unless such issues are "enmeshed" with the elements of certification, or unless resolution of such issues is "essential" or "necessary" to the certification decision. See Brinker, 53 Cal.4th at 1023, 1025. As a general matter, plaintiffs are not required to prove that a challenged policy is in fact unlawful in order to obtain class certification.
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